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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Agency-Effect of Parol Authority to Complete Deed Incomplete on
Delivery - Michael Burns, an attorney, was asked to come to the
decedent's home to prepare a deed. He prepared the deed and had it
executed by the decedent before two witnesses. Because the descrip-
tion to the property was not available, the decedent instructed Burns
to procure the proper description and insert it in the instrument,
have it recorded and deliver it to the grantee. two days later and
just four days before the grantor's death the description was inserted.
Held: Parol authority may be given to complete a conveyance by
later inserting a material portion omitted at the time of execution
and acknowledgment, and when the insertion is made, no further
execution is required. Prosser v. Nickolay, 249 Wis. 77, 23 N.W. 2nd
403 (1946).
The Wisconsin Statutes require that instruments to operate as
deeds be under seal.' The rule stated by the Restatement of Agency
is that an instrument under seal to be executed through an agency
arrangement must be executed by an agent who has obtained written
authorization under seal.2 This is a codification of the strict common
law rule that the principal's authorization to the agent be made by
an instrument of equal dignity.
To admit an exception, Wisconsin thrusts a wedge into the general
rule. The alteration of a sealed instrument is upheld if parol or im-
plied authority is granted to the agent. In State ex rel Darwin v.
White' a bond was executed by the school treasurer and sureties for
an undeterminable amount The instrument was left with the clerk
who agreed to insert in the blank space the amount when it was
ascertained. The intent that the clerk write in the sum of the bond
was clear and undisputed. The court held that a mere omission to
insert words intended and authorized to be inserted cannot be held
to defeat the bond. To hold otherwise would allow technicality to
defeat an intention that would be given effect save for a legal remnant
which states4 in increasing numbers are discarding. A reason exists
for the presumption of consideration that is raised by a seal in con-
tracts. In the instant case it is only the seal that stands in the way
of effecting the grantor's intentions because the lack of acknowledg-
ment and attestation does not impede the transfer of interest as be-
tween the parties.5 The agent could not hurdle the barrier of a seal
1 Section 235.01, Wisconsin Statutes; Kohler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 2
Black (U.S.) 715 (1862); Dreutzer v. Lawrence, 58 Wis. 594, 17 N.W. 423
(1883): An instrument lacking a seal is not properly executed as a deed suffi-
cient to convey legal title.
2. Section 28(1), Restatement of Agency.
3 State ex rel Dorwin v. White, 161 Wis. 170, 152 N.W. 825 (1915).
4 Williston on Contracts, Rev. ed., Vol. I, Section 218. Satute changing common
law of sealed instruments.
5 Slaughter v. Bernards, 88 Wis. 111, 59 N.W. 576 (1894) ; Harrass v. Edwards,
94 Wis. 459, 69 N.W. 69 (1896): A deed takes effect to pass title upon its
execution and delivery and not when it is attested and acknowledged.
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RECENT DECISIONS
on account of the ancient rule. The propriety and justness of an ad-
verse conclusion was early recognized in Wisconsin. As in the instant
case concerning the insertion of the description to sustain the manifest
intention of the parties, parol authority was recognized as sufficient
to complete the instrument.
Reasonably enough, this doctrine is extended to cover cases where
the principal's intentions are disregarded by the agent. In Nelson v.
McDonald7 where the agent exceeded his autiority in filling certain
blanks, the principal was bound by his parol authorization. The agent
inserted in a mortgage the description of the homestead which belonged
to his wife rather than one of property owned by him alone, which
he represented to his wife he was mortgaging. The principal put the
agent into a position to perpetrate the fraud and she was liable for
the acts performed within the scope of his apparent authority. Viewed
in a certain light, the decision gives effect to the intention of the
parties. The principal intended that a mortgage be executed and that
intent was transferred to the mortgage completed by the agent.
It seems that the seal is disregarded in the decision of the instant
case. The seal is ignored to allow insertion in an already executed
instrument a material alteration. The conclusion is that it is an ex-
ception to the common law rule of "equal dignity". It is an exception
that is in keeping with the trend which in many jurisdictions has been
to abrogate or modify the seal's effect through statutory provision
allowing expression of intent to prevail over archaic technicality.
Augmenting this judicial chipping at the seal, the legislatures in 1943
further confined the seal's effective scope by providing for recordation
of instruments without a seal or attestation on the condition that they
be acknowledged in the manner and form set forth in the chapterY
By the use of the form of acknowledgment provided, it appears that
the necessity of the seal may be abolished. This places Wisconsin
among the number of states 0 who have abolished the distinction be-
tween sealed and unsealed instruments. But this would seem to be
merely an alternate method in the execution of instruments to those
already in use, which have not been abolished by the legislature.
EDWARD PATCH
6 Van Etta v. Evenson, 28 Wis. 33 at 37, 9 Am. Rep. 486 (1871): "They are
grounds of the purest and most unalloyed technicality, originating in a state of
things and condition of the law which have long since passed away . . . The
great weight of authority undoubtedly is, that effect will be given to the plain
intention of the parties, notwithstanding the instrument may be under seal, and
notwithstanding the technical rules of the early common law with respect to
the execution and delivery of such instruments."
7 Nelson v. McDonald, 80 Wis. 605, 50 N.W. 893 (1891).
8 Section 329.14, Wisconsin Statutes (1945).
9 Section 329, Wisconsin Statutes (1945).10 Fn. 4, supra.
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